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This work presents the elements of economic analysis of law that occur in the
thought of Gaetano Filangieri. In the pages of La Scienza della Legislazione the
Neapolitan writer develops a utilitarian and economic investigation that pays
attention to the judgments individuals make over social phenomena at the margin
point. A proof of this development can be found in the explanation of the principle
of decreasing marginal utility, argued in Head XXXI of Book III, which represents
one of the most effective demonstrations that can be found before the end of
nineteenth-century literature. The most remarkable fact is that, of all the five parts
that compose the Filangierian work, the most rich in economic arguments is
dedicated to ‘‘Criminal Laws.’’
This article will point out this and other innovative results of the Filangerian
analysis, and will also offer a reconstruction of the economic theory on crime and
punishment presented in La Scienza della Legislazione. Filangieri’s criminal
doctrine represents a significant example of the Enlightenment antecedents of
‘‘law and economics,’’ as well as the better known contributions made by
Beccaria and Bentham.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This essay presents the elements of the economic analysis of law in the thought
of Gaetano Filangieri.1 In the pages of La Scienza della Legislazione (LSDL), the
Neapolitan writer shows the tendency to develop a utilitarian and economic
investigation of law and public institution, which pays attention to the marginal
judgments that individuals express over social phenomena.
The fact that of the five parts composing the above-mentioned work by Filangieri,
Book III—which is dedicated to ‘‘Criminal Laws’’—is the richest in original
economic arguments is of considerable historical importance. Filangieri, like other
writers of the eighteenth century—Cesare Bonesana di Beccaria, for example—-
shows a great interest in the criminal law studied through the aid of economics.2
From an historiographical point of view, it is important to note in this author
a sensibility towards themes such as rational behavior, psychological motivations,
and individual choices, which is close to today’s neoclassical trend. In addition,
the presence of such a reflection applied to the juridical sphere is unusual, even
because it is carried out with remarkable lucidity and clearness. A proof of this can be
found in the explanation of the principle of decreasing marginal utility, argued in
Head XXXI of the work, which represents one of its most effective demonstrations
worked out before the end of the nineteenth century.
This essay will highlight this and other innovative results of the Filangierian
analysis, and will also give a reconstruction of the economic theory on crime and
punishment worked out in La Scienza della Legislazione. In fact, Filangieri’s doctrine
on crime is in itself a significant example of the Enlightenment antecedents of ‘‘law
and economics,’’ just as are the best-known contributions by Beccaria and Bentham,
already emphasized by Gary Becker (1968, p. 209).3
For the sake of the history of the economic thought, this work aims also to show
the advisability of deepening the study of the juridical works of those authors who, in
times prior to the institutionalization of political economy, had played the double role
1Gaetano Filangieri (1752–1788) was one of the most renowned exponents of the Neapolitan
Enlightenment. As the younger son of one of the most ancient and noble families of the Reign of
Naples, he was first introduced to military education and then to the study of law. He distinguished
himself in the court of Charles III for the intellectual rigor he offered to the royal reformist projects
concerning justice and judicial powers. From 1780 to 1785 (and posthumously in 1791), when he retired
to private life, he published the five books of La Scienza della Legislazione, yet leaving its project
unfinished. This work gained international success comparable to that of other great masters of the
European Enlightenment, such as Cesare Bonesana di Beccaria or Charles Louis de Secondat de
Montesquieu, and was translated in all the main European languages. Benjamin Franklin, who was
a friend and correspondent of Filangieri, was also among his estimators, and the thinking of the
Neapolitan scholar met the favor of Masonic lodges all over the world and was censored by the Holy
Office. See D’Alessandro (1991), Ferrone (2003), Trampus (2005), and Pecora (2007).
2On the contribution offered to criminology by economic ideas in the works of juridical enlightenment,
see Simon (2009b).
3Adam Smith’s thought on punishment is different from that of Beccaria, Filangieri, Jeremy Bentham,
and the authors of juridical Enlightenment in general. See Simon (2009c).
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of writers of both economics and law. The case of the Neapolitan scholar seems
to corroborate the hypothesis that in the eighteenth century, it is possible to find
original examples of economic analysis even, if not most of all, in the work of the
authors of the juridical literature of the time on criminal law or on constitutional
organization.
I will start by clarifying the meaning political economy had in La Scienza
della Legislazione and the contribution it offered to the formulation of its reformist
project. In the next section, after introducing the conditions necessary for the
economic study of law, I will present Filangieri’s method and his utilitarianism,
particularly emphasizing the explanation of the theory of value. This will be followed
by a reconstruction of the ideal penal system and of the public policy against
crime, which, in fact, applies economics to the solution of the specific problems of
deterrence and the employment of the penalty. I will point out the most controversial
aspects of the Filangierian analysis. Some final considerations will draw conclusions
about the contribution this essay makes to the historiography on the antecedents of
neoclassical economics and of law and economics.
II. THE ROLE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY IN LA SCIENZA DELLA
LEGISLAZIONE
The reader will notice from the very first pages that economics has a central role
in La Scienza della Legislazione. The whole of Book II is dedicated to investigating
the laws of population and of richness that, according to Filangieri, rule the
functioning of the economic system. More generally, economics is the main element
of the ideal that inspired the thought of the Neapolitan writer, and is described in the
first lines of the plan of the work he conceived. The only real object of laws is the
pursuit of wealth, which is summarized in the need to grant a wealthy existence; in
the freedom to enjoy, preserve, and increase property; in the possibility to buy and
sell useful goods; and in the safety of life and property in the relationship with
authorities and other individuals. The seven distinct parts that compose the
Filangierian project, of which only five have actually been written, represent a study
on the way in which the various legal structures superintending the organization of
society can allow citizens to attain adequate levels of happiness.4 Thus, each book
deals with a specific aspect of how the legal systems of the countries, which intend
to assure the highest advantages for their members, should operate. It is not by
chance, but rather by following a logical order, that the laws of economics are
dealt with at the beginning, in order to immediately analyze which conditions allow
the production and distribution of wealth. Then, in the following parts devoted to
criminal law, education, religion, property, and family, how to safeguard and enjoy
wealth inside the civil consortium are analyzed.
4A recent historical reconstruction of the political and economic dimension of happiness in the modern
age has been masterfully carried out by Trampus (2008).
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Filangieri’s economic thought is mainly oriented to intensive study of the
requirements of the process of growth in the European nations.5 He builds causal
connections in order to study how economic phenomena happen. His consideration is
quite broad, to the point that it includes a varied set of questions; it is also sharp
and appealing for the reader in treatment of this issue. From a theoretical point of
view, La Scienza della Legislazione reveals the influence played by the main authors
and tendencies of the eighteenth century. In his study on the progress of economic
systems, Filangieri presents an interesting synthesis between doctrines that come
from distinct schools and national styles, such as the Scottish Moralism, the Italian
Enlightenment literature, and, above all, the Physiocracy from the other side of the
Alps, whose contribution is prevailing and strongly characterizing.6 In its results, the
Filangierian operation is accomplished (and fascinating, from an intellectual point of
view), even though, for the history of economic thought, it bears the considerable
flaw of not excelling in analytical originality.7 This explains why the Neapolitan
scholar doesn’t stand out in the historiography of economic thought, though it
must not be forgotten that his liberalism is one of those rare cases that favorably
overcame the extremely severe judgment of Francesco Ferrara (1955).
Probably Filangieri’s best contribution to economic culture cannot be seen in
the explanation of how competitive markets, international trade, or the distribution of
income work. Where La Scienza della Legislazione offers innovative and historically
significant results is the relationship between economics and the institutional and
legal framework. In this work, the constitutional and legislative context has a not-
indifferent role in the prosperity of a nation; on the contrary, it plays a decisive role.
The wealth of a country depends on the interaction of rules, codes, and public
authorities with the economic facts, and the obtained effects will vary according to
the different possible resulting combinations. The adopted method is in itself
a testimony of this, since it proceeds by comparing different ideal types of
government of society, or the real experiences of the states at the time, with the
previous historical ones. The ability of a legislator is reflected in the choice of the
most appropriate juridical solution in order to consent to growth, because an error
could eventually compromise that growth. The economic system, then, is not
independent in its functioning, but indissolubly linked to the political and legal
spheres that condition its action.8
5A brief description of the economic thought of Filangieri can be found in Faucci (2000), and a recent
reconstruction of the economic contents of La Scienza della Legislazione is given in an article by
Silvestrini (2006), in which the Filangierian economic theory is analyzed by referring to the new
interpretative schemes developed during the last years by the historiography on the Neapolitan writer. The
author traces philologically the intellectual debt that the economic ideas of Filangieri have towards the
main exponents of the Italian and European literature, but, at the same time, points out the originality of
the synthesis it gives.
6Ferrone (2003, p. 50), believes Filangieri could have read the Wealth of Nations either in its original
English edition or, more probably, in Italian-written extracts.
7In this essay I will demonstrate that this judgment has to be revised, since it doesn’t take into
consideration the relation between law and economics, and most of all because it ignores the contents of
Book III.
8Book II of the work is entirely devoted to an investigation of the consequences of the different legislative
structures on the growth of population and richness in Europe.
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This means that if laws are instruments capable of affecting in such a significant
way the prosperity of a country, they have to be judged by their ability to bring
a greater utility to individuals without causing self-defeating consequences. A law
must not be judged ex ante by the formal justice that can be intrinsic in its command,
but by the tangible effects it can produce and their consistency with the aims wished.9
‘‘A law can never be said to be good, when it is not able to produce the effect the
legislator wants to obtain; and uselessness has never been an indifferent circum-
stance, for a law. For if to judge by the effects is a bad system, this rule can have
place in everything, but legislation’’ (Filangieri 1780–85, Head I, Book II).10
In La Scienza della Legislazione, the economic analysis is carried out well beyond
the contents of Book II, since it becomes a logical criterion with ehich to work out
a general theory on the organization of society. The work witnesses the Enlighten-
ment dream of reforming institutions and laws to produce a political order ruled by
reason, capable of assuring each man of the possibility to reach the highest possible
happiness.11 Political economy helps this project since the assumptions of rationality
from which it moves make it an appealing means of investigation in the juridical
sphere, an explanatory key to the understanding of both individual and collective
behavior, and a principle by which to judge the goodness of laws and of public
authorities. In those years, for a large part of European reformism, economics rose to
be a universal language capable of indicating and expressing, through the logic of
economic calculation, that ‘‘rational order’’ that has to oversee the public sphere. And
this mission sets economics against traditional jurisprudence, which is believed to be
a conservative science whose knowledge, so complex and intricate to the point of
becoming inaccessible to public opinion, is regarded as almost esoteric and as
a source of income for the stipendiary magistrate class. La Scienza della Legislazione
shares this tendency and political economy can thus be traced throughout the text,
since it is used by Filangieri to support his reasoning on law, morals, or politics.
The attention of the Neapolitan writer towards the institutional conditions that
bring wealth has recently become the starting point for an historiographical
revision, which has pointed out the modernity of Filangierian thought.12 The term
9Pecora (2007) believes that the attention Filangieri paid to the relative goodness of laws, which were
judged beginning with their effects, is a contradiction to the Doctrine of Natural Law he professed in
LSDL (1780–85), which ends by compromising the consistency of the entire work.
10Filangieri shows a ‘demystifying’ attitude towards the legislative command, which, in more recent
times, would become an acquired datum of modern economic analysis of law. La Scienza della
Legislazione continuously dwells on the mistakes made by legislators, the unexpected effects that often
are stimulated by laws, or the distorted incentives the latter can send to individuals. I translated this and
the other following quotations of Filangieri myself.
11On Enlightenment reformism, see Venturi (1969).
12I refer to the studies carried out by Vincenzo Ferrone and those carried out within the activities of the Centro
studi sull’Illuminismo Giovanni Stiffoni of the Universita` Ca’ Foscari in Venice. See Ferrone (2003) and
Trampus (2005). For a synthesis of the results obtained by this historiography, see Simon (2007). Formerly,
the prevailing reconstruction of the thought of the Neapolitan writer was excessively anchored to the
traditional interpretative schemes of enlightened despotism, and it didn’t help to point out the original aspects
of the Filangierian work, handing down to us an ungenerous judgment of it of eclecticism. The pages written
by Cavanna (2005) are an example of this way of thinking. The Centro studi sull’Illuminismo europeo
G. Stiffoni of the Universita` Ca’ Foscari in Venice has published, in the last years, an unabridged edition of
LSDL directed by Ferrone. As regards the international success of this work, see Trampus (2005).
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‘‘Enlightenment constitutionalism’’ describes the theoretical commitment to the
speculation of a structure of power capable of fully expressing human dignity,
starting from the fundamental rights of the single individual, sanctioned by the law of
nature. The reformism of the work proposes a process of transformation of the
constitutions that make a citizen, and his needs, the main actor in the society where
he lives. The ‘‘republicanism of the modern’’ category further specifies this project,
pointing out how distant it is from the tradition of the ideal republican model, based
on perfect equity, hostile against any economical interest and fearful of progress. The
constitution of La Scienza della Legislazione, on the contrary, looks for a material
basis in economics, capable of giving concreteness to human rights, and proposes the
idea that their exercise does not leave out of consideration the reality of a modern
commercial society, characterized by the division of work, the pursuit of individual
wealth, marketing, and meritocracy.13 The principle of social justice itself, described
in Head II of Book I and in Head XXXV of Book II, is not a mere enunciation of a
purely ethic thesis, but a real plan for a fair distribution of national income, careful in
increasing the general wealth of the nation and in stimulating its growth.
Political economy is, then, part of the Filangierian reformatory design, and it can
be found either in its more usual aspect as a study of the production and distribution
phenomena, or as the inspiring theme of a political model, or as instrument for
a rational analysis of both the legal system and social behaviors.
III. THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF RIGHTS AND THEIR VALUE
Even though La Scienza della Legislazione is addressed to sovereigns and govern-
ments, and deals with the economic systems or the penal and civil systems of the
nations, it should be pointed out that it focuses mainly on individuals. This is
consistent with the desire of Filangieri to create the economic, institutional, and
juridical conditions for citizens to live a dignified and wealthy life, and to truly
enjoy the inviolable human rights. The definition of ‘‘social wealth’’ in itself has
an individualist basis and consists in the aggregation of the utility of the single
individuals.14 ‘‘Public happiness is nothing but the aggregate of the private happiness
of all the individuals who compose society’’ (Filangieri 1780–85, Head XXXIV,
Book II).
The process through which it is possible to attain public interest, starting from
the private one, is utilitarian. The evaluation of pleasures and pains is, as it was for a
good many of the Italian authors of the time, the most valid criterion by which to
come to collective decisions that can bring advantages to the majority of the
body of citizens. However, Filangierian utilitarianism is far from Benthamian
13Pecora (2007) reconstructs the alternate fortunes of the work of Filangieri in the course of the centuries,
from the eighteenth-century initial success to its decline, caused by the severe attack made by Constant,
up to the renewed interest awakened by the studies Ferrone carried out.
14For a study in-depth of how Filangieri defines and employs concepts such as ‘‘happiness,’’ ‘‘utility,’’
and ‘‘wealth,’’ see the reconstruction of his epistemological and philosophical thought made by Ferrone
(2003). Yet, the history of the economic thought lacks a work that investigates the hedonist foundations of
La Scienza della Legislazione and its consequences in the development of economic analysis and of
economic policy.
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consequentialism because it has to match with the doctrine of natural law, and the
possibility for it to clash with it has to be excluded. Justice and equality, as well as
human rights, do not rise extemporaneously as a result of the economic calculation;
they are already sanctioned in the rational order that rules nature. Utility is the logical
principle that helps in understanding the commands of natural law and in applying
legislation to it. Is a solution that aims at giving greater ethical consistence to
utilitarianism, and it frequently occurs in the Italian literature of the eighteenth and
part of the nineteenth centuries.15
The analysis in La Scienza della Legislazione develops by observing the influence
that laws and institutions exercise on human behavior and the possible consequences
for public happiness. The scheme adopted to study the motivations and actions of
single individuals is characterized by individualism and hedonism. Men act in
accordance with their own interest, and establish social relationships to obtain
a benefit. Filangieri reconstructs the relationships established in society due to the
idea of contract. The community—being represented by the authorities—and every
citizen give life to exchanges whose aim is to bring advantage to both the parties.
The moving force that drives the action is ‘‘the love for power,’’ which has its
origin in the desire for what is pleasant and aversion for all that is painful.16 Power is,
in fact, the ability to obtain from the civil consortium what is needed to be happy.
If it is true that the love for pleasure, and the aversion for pain, are the two springs
which push man to action, it doesn’t take a lot to see that the love for power is the
real principle of action in all governments; for this love for power takes its origin in
the love for pleasure in itself. Everyone desires to be as happy as possible: everyone
then desires to have in his hand such a power that forces the other men to contribute
with all their forces to his happiness, and this is the reason why one desires to
command them (Filangieri 1780–85, Head XII, Book I).
This results in people’s aiming at having enough power to satisfy their own needs,
but this possibility can be acquired only by claiming a credit towards the nation
because of some service offered: ‘‘The services rendered to the homeland are then the
only means that can put the citizen in condition to obtain a portion of power as
a reward for his merits’’ (Filangieri 1780–85, Head XII, Book I).
The nature of the obligation between State and citizen, and its effects on general
wealth, change according to the constitution ruling the country. It is the legal system
with its laws that determines whether the pursuit of a private advantage takes place
with the cooperation of all the members of society and with a common benefit, or
through violence, abuse of power, or corruption, and with a general loss. ‘‘The means
is then always the same, but the effects are different. The love for power itself, which
in a free and well ordered republic makes the citizen virtuous and a lover of his
homeland, makes him a monster instead in a despotic government. It will give birth at
15The need to conjugate utilitarianism with the law of nature is present in other Italian authors of the
eighteenth century, Cesare Beccaria above all, and was felt also during the Risorgimento, as witnessed by
the works of Gian Domenico Romagnosi (1791).
16The Filangierian hedonism reveals, in its contents and its language, elements of continuity with the one
conceived by Helvetius, from which it seems, partly at least, to take inspiration.
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the same time to a Curtius, a Decius, a Fabius in Rome, and to the vilest slave in
Asia’’ (Filangieri 1780–85, Head XII, Book I).
Filangieri uses this reasoning to develop his criticism towards despotic regimes
and to exalt the virtues of republican systems, and aims at showing the fundamental
importance of constitutional law in driving a State towards a political structure
characterized by freedom, economic prosperity, and equity. In this reflection, I’m
interested in pointing out his solution for the problem of how single individuals, who
are moved by egoistic motivations, can establish relationships of reciprocal esteem
and reach forms of peaceful life in common. This question recurs in the history of the
ideas of the eighteenth century, and is also at the basis of the very well known ‘‘Adam
Smith’s problem.’’ La Scienza della Legislazione solves the dilemma by giving the
legal framework the task of encouraging the single individual to collaboration,
thus avoiding conflict. Democracy is the system that best serves this purpose for the
specific qualities that characterize it: all citizens can aspire to the best positions;
awards and honors are related to merit; the distribution of offices is carried out
through elections or depends on public opinion. Meritocracy and the need to obtain
the respect of the other men are stimuli capable of driving personal interest towards
those activities that also cause an increase of public utility. ‘‘Every citizen will then
be persuaded that, in order to obtain some portion of power, he has to gain the opinion
of the people, and that to acquire this opinion he has to serve the latter, he has to
employ his talents to let them to be known, he has to finally make his virtues shine
with useful actions and with the benefits he rendered to his homeland’’ (Filangieri
1780–85, Head XII, Book I).
The moment he has to explain how society has to distribute rewards, the
Neapolitan writer gives the reader a first glimpse of a marginalist sensibility. It is
important to order the benefits according to a graduation corresponding to the
different contributions given by single individuals. Every citizen will commit himself
to as much work as needed to have the reward he aims at, and every increase in the
scale of the gratifications will serve as a stimulus to assure the country a superior
service.
If the measure at which every citizen serves his homeland depends on the benefits he
is offered in reward; if the love for power is the only object of these hopes; if finally
the different degrees of authority that can be appointed to a citizen are the only coin
with which he wants to be paid for his merits.. . . May the law trace the path to follow
to reach the first places, . . . may it fix a certain escalation, a certain graduation; may
the exercise of an office serve, so to say, as a proof and merit to obtain a more shining
one . . . (Filangieri 1780–85, Head XII, Book I).
In the civil life of a nation, for the right to enjoy a certain level of wealth to be
realized, it has necessarily to appear in some legal guise. The ability to command and
obtain whatever is useful consists in the disposability of some rights. This is the
formal aspect under which the goods, and all that is capable of bringing an advantage
to the single individual, have to be presented. The pact that gives origin to a society in
itself is nothing but an obligation by which a single individual commits himself to
fulfil some duties in order to acquire a set of rights the community transmits to him.
Each one of these rights represents, for the citizen, the right to profit from a utility
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in the civil consortium that, as for any good, can become an object of exchange
and can be transferred from one subject to another.17 Consequently, in Filangieri’s
conception, each right is not independent from human judgments, but is instead the
result of an estimation made by single individuals. Since to each of those rights
corresponds a benefit, it is from the value of the latter that, by translation, the value of
the former can be obtained. Rights, then, have a price as for any other good on
the market.
At this point, to further analyze the juridical reasoning present in La Scienza
della Legislazione, it is appropriate to study his theory on value. It is clear that, in
reading this work, one can find a psychological explanation of how prices are
determined: they result from the opinion of men, and these opinions are mainly based
on utility without any particular consideration regarding the cost of production or
other objective elements. Even though Filangieri draws from a quite heterogeneous
literature on economics, regarding the question of value, he follows fully the
subjectivist and utilitarian Italian tradition. Another element of syntony with Italian
thought can be found in the references Filangieri makes to the influence rarity has on
price. The forces of supply and demand reflect, the will consumers have to pay the
lowest possible amount of money on one hand, and the opposite will producers
have to earn greater and greater amounts of money on the other. The prevalence of the
former or the latter depends on the available quantity of the good, which has a direct
effect on its value. Scarcity, in fact, determines high prices, while abundance
drives more moderate prices. ‘‘The competition that origins from their multitude,
has to necessarily degrade the price’’ (Filangieri 1780–85, Head III, Book II).18
So far, the Neapolitan scholar doesn’t diverge in originality and depth of analysis
from the other authors who, in the eighteenth century, explained the value of goods
through the tastes of the consumers, utility, and their availability. In La Scienza della
Legislazione, the elements that are strongly innovative become apparent only in the
pages of Book III on penalty. It’s these passages that demonstrate precisely how the
quantity of certain goods affects the estimation single individuals have of their utility.
In Head XXX, Filangieri claims that value is referable to human opinion, which is
strictly conditioned by the familiarity one has with the object in question. The
frequency at which positive or negative sensations occur generally has an influence
on our judgment, making these sensations desirable or unpleasant when they are not
usual, and indifferent when they become familiar.
Now it cannot be doubted, that the strongest impressions lose their maximum
strength, if they are frequent. The callosity, that appears in the surface of animated
bodies, produced by the replicate percussion of external bodies, is not different from
that one, which generates in the spirit, with the replicated image of the objects that
appear before it, if not as regards the subject. The intensity of any motion of the soul
17Filangieri mainly deals with the transfers between the State and the citizens, but it is logical to expect
him to deal also with those between single individuals in books VI and VII of his work (which were never
completed, though) dedicated to property and family. In Head IV of Book I, however, he specifies that not
all rights can be the object of transfer without offending human dignity.
18In these passages, Filangieri mostly dwells on the market forces that determine the value of the factors
of production and the consequences on the distribution of income among the social classes.
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diminishes as the number and frequency of the causes that excite it increase
(Filangieri 1780–85, Head XXX, Book III).
This relation has direct effects when it comes to pricing. All that brings a benefit
has some invariable inner qualities and each dose of it is, in absolute terms, perfectly
the same as the others. This circumstance is not important, though, in establishing the
value of the goods, which exclusively depends on the judgment of single individuals,
a judgment that doesn’t take objective and unmodifiable elements into consideration,
but simply the benefit obtained when its consumption has ended. The last utility of
largely available and widely consumed goods will then receive less consideration
than one of more rare things, and, consequently, the former will be paid for less than
the latter. To better illustrate this concept, La Scienza della Legislazione uses
a metaphor:
[N]ow impressions, that are too frequent over the opinion, weaken the opinion itself.
This truth will appear more clearly if explained by an example. There is a serious
danger hanging over a population. A daring citizen runs the most serious risks to save
his homeland. The outcome corresponds to his hopes. He returns from his glorious
exploit covered with the signs of his patriotism and bravery. The nation blesses his
hero, and the public opinion equals him to the Gods. This danger is renewed well
over a thousand times. A thousand citizens, one after the other, run the same risks to
defend their intimidated homeland, and each one of them gloriously returns from his
happy exploit. The wealth of the homeland is due both to the latter and to the former.
The risks to which the first one exposed himself, are not higher than the ones to
which the last one has exposed himself. The people are convinced of the equality of
the benefit obtained by both of them, and of the equality of their merit. But will
the heroism of the last citizen cause in the public opinion the same impression the
heroism of the first one had caused? Having been shocked for so many times by
replicated impressions of the same type, will public opinion be affected as strongly
as at the beginning? What effect will these repeated impressions have? The last hero
will not gain the same positive opinion the first one gained; but the first will lose all
he had gained more than the last one.. . . we will find that both in the penalties and the
rewards of opinion, their value decreases as the number of the punished or of the
rewarded multiplies (Filangieri 1780–85, Head XXXI, Book III).
All the elements that make the Filangierian definition analytically complete,
effective, and comparable with the more famous later ones by Carl Menger and
William S. Jevons can be traced in La Scienza della Legislazione. It is not total utility
that directly indicates price: utility decreases with consumption, and value is
determined at the margin by the last unit of the considered goods. By extrapolation,
the conclusion could be drawn that Filangieri is also aware of the fact that the
consumer enjoys some revenue, since the Neapolitan scholar emphasizes the fact that
all doses are equal in quality; our satisfaction depends on each of them and the
previous ones would have received greater remuneration if other doses weren’t to be
added after.
The merits of the author, though, do not consist only in the anticipation of the
marginalist principle, which he probably shares with other writers of works on
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economics of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The original contribution the
Neapolitan scholar offers to the history of economic ideas consists in going beyond
that brilliant statement in order to show its application for the solution of actual
social issues. Besides, as we will see, if the sphere in which his intuition is employed
is the juridical one, we have further elements with which to estimate the innovative
significance of La Scienza della Legislazione.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST CRIME
Book III of La Scienza della Legislazione, more than the other books, develops an
economic analysis to work out a theory on penal deterrence. This is one of the most
discussed topics in the eighteenth century and is at the core of most of the reformist
projects of the time, since reorganizing justice means questioning the most traditional
aspects of the Ancien Re´gime.
First of all, as regards the role of the State and its relations with society and single
individuals, a firm protest took place against the indiscriminate faculty of the
institutions to repress and punish men and their behavior with no proof of actual
benefit.19 The main target of criticism was the employment of penalty as a political
instrument to assert the royal authority. In addition, the identification of crime with
sin and every reference to religious arguments to define it were rejected. Conse-
quently, also, the idea of punishment as an opportunity for a redeeming expiation
was rejected, together with the bloody apparatus that aimed at emending the soul
through pain and, at the same time, at exalting the power of the sovereign over the
body of the criminal.
Another object of opposition was the fact that judicial power was exercised by
a gowned class, composed of magistrates and jurists, who gained considerable
income from their charge and who exercised their duty in an arbitrary way, without
any clearness and in a context of great uncertainty about laws and their inter-
pretation.20 Such battle was shared by the authors of juridical Enlightenment,
Beccaria included, and was both a dogmatic confrontation and a real political
dispute.21 The most determined instances in favor of codification regarded just
criminal law and its procedure, where the need for a reform appeared more urgent.
In its action of demolition of the past and proposal of a new system inspired by
reason, juridical Enlightenment often employed utilitarian doctrine to back up its
arguments, and relied widely on economic calculation to show the validity of the
19A masterly description of how justice worked in the Ancien Re´gime can be found in the famous work
by Foucault (1975), which also has the merit of analyzing in depth the theoretical contribution that
utilitarianism and political economy offer to the theories carried out by the juridical Enlightenment.
20This same criticism was moved against feudal magistracy and that of the Inquisition.
21In the opening of his work, Filangieri declares himself to be aware of being exposed to the dangers
coming from the hostility and reaction of the most powerful classes in the reign. It is a historical fact,
however, that the Neapolitan author and other exponents of juridical Enlightenment generally were in
high favor with the reformist governments, who were interested in strengthening their sovereignty against
every privilege from which originated intermediate, independent, and autonomous powers. It is, though,
incorrect to reduce the thought of these authors, and of Filangieri in particular, to a mere support of
enlightened despotism, thus neglecting the republican elements present in the writings of the time.
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results to which those arguments aimed.22 This is particularly evident again in the
domain of criminal law, where the theoretical constructs worked out by Beccaria and
Jeremy Bentham, to cite only two of the most representative authors, are based on
utility and on the maximization of wealth. This can be traced in the conception of
crime as a damage causing a social loss, in the employment of punishment as
a disincentive addressed to rational subjects, and in the working out of public policies
that prosecute crime by taking into consideration the costs and benefits of illegality
and of its repression. Some elements that are referable to Marginalism can also be
found in the discussion of the gradation of crimes and the corresponding scale of
penalties. All these aspects have correctly led to the assertion that the origins of
modern economic analysis of law can be found in the juridical and economic thought
of the eighteenth century (Becker 1968; Posner 1973; Shavell 2003).
In this panorama, La Scienza della Legislazione appears to be a text oriented, even
more than the others of the time, towards the economic study of law and of social
behavior, and carries out an analysis that employs a proto-neoclassical logic, and it
applies that logic to a wider set of objects, all with original theoretical results.
I will proceed to reconstruct the ideal penal system Filangieri worked out, which is
effectively summarized in the twenty assertions of Head XXV. I will make a further
synthesis of it and point out its most significant points.
I begin with the faculty to punish, whose origin is of a contractual nature and
comes from the pact that gave life to the civil consortium. Laws are the expression of
the obligations agreed upon with the social contract, and assign rights as a reward for
doing one’s duties. Crime is the violation of a duty carried out to the detriment of the
benefits enjoyed by other men. Consequently, whoever commits a crime, having
disregarded the obligation undertaken with the rest of the nation, automatically loses
whatever he should have gained as a counterpart. ‘‘If social pacts are nothing but
the duties each citizen contracts with society in return for the rights he gains; every
violation of a pact has then to be followed by the loss of a right’’ (Filangieri 1780–85,
Head XXV, Book III).
The loss suffered by whoever commits a crime is not absolute, and has to be
measured according to the criterion of the equivalence with the loss caused to society.
The Filangierian theory that explains that rights have a price (as with goods), and that
according to this price they can be ordered hierarchically, has a first application in
this passage. A sanction must be inflicted, affecting a right whose utility coincides
with the one that has been violated by crime, and this sanction must consider that this
relation is not invariable in time and space, but depends on the influence the historical
and geographical circumstances have on the populations when it comes to assigning
relative values.
If all these rights are not equally precious, and if not all crimes are equally baleful for
society, it is right that whoever refrains from committing the most serious crime, and
commits the less serious one, keeps the most precious right and loses the less
precious one. If the relative value of social rights can change with the difference in
22For a study in-depth of juridical Enlightenment, see the works by Cavanna (2005)., Fasso` (2008), and
Frigo (1990).
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the political circumstances of the populations, the legislator must not ignore them in
fixing the penalties. The exile from the homeland, for example, could be a capital
punishment in a given government, while it could be the minimum punishment in
another. . . (Filangieri 1780–85, Head XXV, Book III).
The Enlightenment trust in the process of civilization led Filangieri to foresee that,
at a certain point in time, less strict punishments could be employed to obtain the
same deterrence. Progress tends to increase the value of the rights enjoyed by the
citizens, making the spurs to commit crime less and less appealing. In addition,, the
loss caused by the punishment has gained a higher value, thus modifying the
opportunity cost of illegal actions. ‘‘If, as government and society improve
themselves, the absolute value of all social rights increases proportionally to the
progress in public prosperity; if as the latter increases, the spur to commit crime
decreases, and the pain that comes from the loss of the social advantages increases; it
is then clear that, as society improves, punishments could be softened without any
risk’’ (Filangieri 1780–85, Head XXV, Book III).
The criteria to identify criminal behaviour demand, as part of the requisites, will
and action. Society has no interest in investigating and prosecuting simple intentions
if they don’t materialize in a harmful event. At the same time, for intention to result
as crimes and be chargeable to whoever has committed them, it must come from
a free and conscious deliberation.
When it comes to establishing penalties, the legislator has to consider the fact
that crimes differ both in ‘‘quality’’—i.e., the usefulness of the right that has been
violated—and in ‘‘grade,’’ or the resolution with which the attempt is carried out.
Sanctions have to coincide with the loss caused by the crime, which is calculated by
estimating how much the right is reduced in value by the harmfulness of the crime.23
If there were wide margins of impunity, to the point that the penalty would become
less fearful, its strictness should be increased as much as is needed to compensate for
its lower chance of enforcement in order to obtain the same level of deterrence.24
Immediately after stating the general principles, Filangieri begins his analysis
by explaining the rising of the criminal phenomenon and the need to repress it. The
Neapolitan scholar observes human behavior and the choices that produce it, and he
lingers over the role of rationality in understanding the advantages of sociality and
over what costs to bear in order to enjoy them. This is not to take for granted, though,
that individual logic automatically leads to the institution of a civilized society. It is
fully predictable and understandable for the single citizen to wish to benefit from the
utility that social life offers him, but at the same time not to wish to bear the burdens
23Filangieri defines this procedure as ‘‘combining the quality with the grade.’’ The equivalence between
the value of the penalty and the loss due to crime is a conclusion at which Beccaria and Bentham also
arrived; it has been proposed again centuries later by Becker and is the central point of the modern
economic theory of deterrence.
24The criterion of correcting a scarce probability of enforcement of the penalty by an increase of its
strictness was already employed by Beccaria and Bentham, and is today one of the main points of
Becker’s model. Yet, Becker pushes the principle well beyond, and employs it to work out a deterrence
policy marked by a tendency to saving money, which is not typical in the works of juridical
Enlightenment.
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it imposes on him in exchange. The lack of cooperation is a strategy consistent
with the nature of man and his passions, and it can be opposed only by the threat of
a penalty.
Though depriving man of part of his natural freedom, society cannot destroy the
source of this innate passion that lies within him. The heart of man seeks
independence, even if reason shows him the advantages of dependence. In good
laws he sees a support to his security; but also, an unpleasant restraint to his passions.
He sees that it is laws that bring him happiness in the social state; but at the same
time they deprive him of that happiness he could enjoy in the natural state. He knows
that laws prescribe only what is convenient for both the universal and the particular
wealth of the social beings; but he feels that they forbid him what is convenient for
his pleasures.. . . These thoughts that don’t dissuade an honest man from observing
the law, make a wicked man conceive the secret plan of leaving the laws to the others
for his security, and to free only himself from this restraint at his advantage. He
would like social bonds to get more strict for the others, on the contrary he would
like to be the only one to be freed from them. He would like to be independent and
secure, he would like to enjoy all of his natural freedom, without losing civil security.
These are the plans of a wicked man, from which comes the need for penalties. Penal
sanction is that part of the law by which the citizen is offered the choice between the
fulfilment of a social duty or the loss of a social right (Filangieri 1780–85, Head
XXVI, Book III).
The aim of the penal sanction, then, is to discourage an intention to dodge the
obligations society asks its members to fulfil; first of all the obligation of not
attempting to decrease the private wealth of other members of society or the general
wealth in order to increase personal wealth illegally. Punishment is not, then,
characterized by features of expiation or revenge, since it exclusively aims at the
public interest of defending the civil consortium from the occurrence of those acts
that can cause a loss.25 Any other motivation would turn into an unjustified sacrifice
of utility, since the punishment inflicted on the guilty doesn’t pay back the victim, nor
society, for the damage suffered, but, rather, adds to it, thus making the final result
even more negative. In theories on crime, the past has no more significance and the
only thing that matters is the present and the future good. This may be an analogy that
Filangieri, and other authors of the time, shares with the following marginalist
perspective.
Since penalty in any case causes a decrease of wealth to both society and the guilty
who receives it, legislators have to consider its cost, and commit to contain the latter
at the minimum possible. It follows that for a policy against crime to discourage
illegal actions, it cannot resort to an indiscriminate strictness, but most of all it has to
be aware that it is impossible to prevent crimes altogether. Any penal system always
works in imperfect conditions, and has to be contented with reducing the number of
illegal actions to the point where the convenience to prosecute against them can still
25For a faithful comparison with the original expressions used by the author, see heads XV, XVI, and
XVII of Book III.
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compensate for the sacrifice in utility sustained. This criterion of economic behavior
for the State is shared by Filangieri, Beccaria, and Bentham, and can also be traced in
contemporary theories.26
La Scienza della Legislazione shows originality of analysis in judging which
behavior causes a crime and deserves repression. As I stated before, the essential
requisite is the occurrence of a harmful action together with a manifest will to
commit it. Such a definition, though, is not sufficient to single out with certainty the
manifestation of a crime, because the crime must be contextualized in the actual
scenario where it takes place. The state of necessity in which a man could find
himself causes conditions of choice within all potentially negative events that could
be classified as illegal in normal conditions. Two clear examples described in this
work are the pilot who throws the load in the sea to save the ship from wrecking, or
the homicide who kills an innocent because his life is under threat from a third
subject. To restate: if we are facing a real crime, then, we have to take into
consideration the costs and benefits involved in each, single, alternative confronting
those who have to decide how they will proceed. The work offers three guiding
solutions that can be summarized in the principle according to which the criminal
choice is the one involving a net social cost that exceeds the individual benefit to
whomever has made it.27
1. The choice in itself between two equally evil actions is never punishable; 2. The
choice of the lesser of two or more unequal evils is not punishable, but the choice of
the greater one is, when no personal interest is involved; 3. Given two or more
unequal evils, the lesser of which harms the interest of the man who is forced to
make a choice, the preference given to the greater one cannot be punishable but in
one case, i.e. when the personal evil avoided is very small, and bearable, and the
elected one is very serious, very prejudicial, either to the whole social body or to
another man (Filangieri 1780–85, Head XXXVI, Book III).
So Filangieri doesn’t limit himself to the simple idea of crime as a non-consensual
transfer of utility, and he seems to find in the costs of transaction an explanation for
over which behavior it is possible to exercise a deterrence.
The central part of the Filangierian theory is the reflection over the optimum
penalty, which contains interesting starting points for an economic analysis of law
and the application of the proto-marginalist principle to the solution of the problem of
organizing an effective policy of deterrence. As already stated, a sanction must result
from the combination of quality and grade. The inflicted penalty is related to the
damage caused by the crime, but its measure can vary within some margins,
according to the lesser or greater responsibility involved in committing it. According
to Filangieri, it’s not enough to state the value of crimes of different quality; it is
also essential to measure and grade the variability in value for each crime.28
26In this and further passages, I will point out how Filangieri seems to reach the conviction that there are
categories of crimes that cannot be prevented because prevention would be ineffective.
27It is not to be disregarded that the conclusions to which Filangieri arrives seem to partly anticipate the
definition of ‘‘efficient crime’’ later formulated by Posner (1973; 1985).
28See Filangieri (1780–85, Head XXXVIII, Book III).
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Legislators have to arrange the criminal scale in such a way that crimes considered
alternative shall be prosecuted with different strictness according to the importance
the harmed right has for society. To begin with, the sanction for the greater crime
has to be fixed, and, following that for each crime down to the most innocuous,
attention must be paid to keeping always a proportional distance between them.29
Filangieri points out six grades of responsibility, three of negligence and three of
fraud, each to be punished with decreasing strictness. The logic lying behind this
classification seems to stem from the idea that, for society, the greater or lesser
intentionality in committing the crime is positively related to the probability of
causing a damage and to its consistency.30 It is important for the levels of punishment
to have consistency, and since the available punishments are a limited set, the same
one can be employed for crimes of different seriousness, but only if regarding distinct
grades. The same penalty can then be applied to a crime committed with the
minimum fraud or to another crime that is less serious but has been committed with
greater negligence.31
To keep the perfect proportion between the penalty applied for the first crime and the
one applied for the second, the former must always exceed the latter, in the same
grade. If, for example, the penalty applied for the first crime with the maximum
grade of fraud is equal to ten, the one applied to the second crime with the maximum
grade of fraud must be at least equal to nine; and if the penalty applied for the first
crime with medium grade of fraud is equal to nine, the one applied for the second
crime in the medium grade of fraud must be at least equal to eight . . . and so on for
the other intermediate grades. Reflecting over this progression will lead to find out
that the penalty applied for the lesser crime of a given grade can be greater than that
one applied for the most serious crime of a given grade, without altering the
established proportion. Homicide, for example, is undoubtedly a more serious crime
than theft. With the first one a more precious pact is broken, than with the second.
The penalty for homicide has then to be greater than that one applied for a theft of
the same grade . . . and this proportion is not altered if the penalty for a theft
committed with the maximum grade of fraud is greater than the one applied for
a homicide, fulfilled either with one of the three grades of negligence or with the
lowest grade of fraud. . . (Filangieri 1780–85, Head XXXIX, Book III).
29In the pages written by Filangieri and the other exponents of juridical Enlightenment, criminal
deterrence has both an intensive margin—that is, the number of potential crimes that can be prevented by
the penalty applied for a given crime—and an extensive margin, represented by the set of potential crimes
of different seriousness that society has to hamper. The literature of the time seems, though, to focus more
on the extensive margin than on the intensive one.
30The grades of fraud and negligence seem to be forms of awaited seriousness of the damage that wrong
behavior can cause. The concept of awaited damage is today central to contemporary economic analysis.
See Shavell (1982; 1985). In Filangieri’s case, it is some sort of intuition, which is still quite far from
today’s developments.
31From the reasoning carried out by Filangieri over the six grades of fraud and negligence, it can be
deduced that the author accepts the possibility of punishing a less serious crime with a penalty one or
three units more strict than that which has to be applied for a higher crime, because he bases his reasoning
on a still not fully defined idea of awaited damage.
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A problem could rise when comparing penalties of different natures, such as
prison, corporal, pecuniary, or infamous penalties, etc. Homogeneous sanctions can
undergo a fractioning of their strictness, clearly indicating which is the strictest and
which the lightest, but in the case of heterogeneity, the question must be answered of
how to determine the correspondent values. The solution reveals the price individuals
allot to the correspondent rights.
How to keep, I have said, the progression between heterogeneous penalties? How to
reduce to a calculation the correspondent value of pecuniary, corporal ones, infamous
ones, or of death penalties? This grading is easily obtained in the same class of
penalties, because the comparison involves homogeneous quantities.. . . But how to
keep this progression, when moving from one class of penalties to another? . . .
Penalty, I have said, is the loss of a right. Not all rights are equally precious, nor has
the same right the same price in all nations.. . . If then penalty is the loss of a right,
and if the rights are not equally precious, or if the same right can have a different
price for two different nations, the legislator then has to do nothing but find out the
relative price his nation gives to the various existing rights, to determine the
corresponding value of the penalties (Filangieri 1780–85, Head XL, Book III).
The need for differentiation of the penalties according to the seriousness of the
crime is one of the priorities in the literature of the time, and can be found also in the
pages written by Montesquieu, Beccaria, and Bentham.32 Filangieri shares with the
other authors the fear that the repression of crimes of different dangerousness with the
same penalty can make the choice between them indifferent, or can even spur the
commission of the worst crimes. He has an equally firm criticism of those policies
that aim at producing deterrence by means of an indiscriminate use of strictness, and
he shares this opinion with the majority of the exponents of juridical Enlighten-
ment.33 The most recurrent argument against draconian penal systems is the difficulty
of maintaining a believable scale of sanctions due to continuous increase in
their intensity. At a certain point, the progression would fail, due to the scarcity of
penalties able to discourage all crimes in a proportional way, and this could lead to
the previously stated scenario of the impossibility of determining the right
punishment for different crimes. As well, an increase in strictness causes both an
increase in the costs of enforcement and an unexpected reaction towards justice
by citizens.
All complain about the multiplicity of assassinations [that] happened in France, and
all blame the law for this evil, for it punishes with death a simple theft. This country
32Today this issue is defined by law and economics with the expression ‘‘marginal deterrence.’’ See
Stigler (1970), Shavell (1992), and Friedman (1993; 2000). Yet, Friedman shows that the principle of
marginal deterrence is valid only if certain given conditions occur: crimes are alternative between
themselves; the private benefits associated with the most serious crime are greater; the probability of
being caught is the same for all crimes or it is even inferior for the most harmful one.
33Contemporary theorists use similar arguments to show the impossibility of following a saving-oriented
public policy by means of continuous increases in strictness in order to compensate for the reduction of
the more expensive probability of enforcement of the penalty.
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lacks a further restraint for a thief, not to let him become an assassin. If he only robs,
he is condemned to the same penalty. Therefore, almost always, the thief becomes an
assassin, because the second crime, without exposing him to a heavier penalty, gets
him rid of an important witness whose complaint would lead him to capital
punishment anyway. Punishing theft with the death has thus multiplied assassina-
tions. The second consequence deriving from the same principle is the impunity of
the less cruel crimes. The general rule is: a tyrannical law cannot live long in a free
nation; a ferocious law has to loose its force in a human nation, sooner or later. If the
legislative authority doesn’t abrogate it, the conspiracy of custom will put it to
silence (Filangieri 1780–85, Head XXX, Book III).
Yet, the Neapolitan writer offers a deeper and more complex analysis on this
topic, and he provides an explanation of why an inconsiderate employment of
strictness can lead to the unexpected effect of diminishing the level of deterrence
rather than increasing it.
Filangieri thinks that every penalty has a double value, an ‘‘absolute value’’ and
a ‘‘value of opinion or of position.’’ The former indicates the objective loss imposed
on the guilty by the sanction, while the latter is the esteem the individuals form over
it. ‘‘Penalties have both an absolute value, and a value of opinion. The former
depends on the price individual members of a society assign to the right which is lost
with that punishment, and the latter depends on how the penalty is applied, or else
on the crime against which the penalty is threatened’’ (Filangieri 1780–85, Head XL,
Book III).34
He maintains that the value attributed to the punishment, which determines the
deterrence it exercises over men, decreases little by little as its employment increases.
If the penalty is employed to repress an increasing number of different crimes, its
utility lessens and ends by not equalizing its absolute value. The latter, in fact,
represents the cost of the penalty, and, since it coincides with the price of the right
that gets lost, is a given and unmodifiable element determined by individuals in
another context. In the Filangierian analysis, the non-automatic identity between
absolute value and value of position can be explained by the circumstance where the
former is an individual judgment, while the second is a social esteem. The absolute
value is perceived as such only by the single subject with which the sanction is
inflicted, and for whom it results as an invariable cost. The value of opinion depends,
instead, on the judgment of society at the moment the last crime is punished, and it
decreases little by little as the penalty is enforced more frequently. The failure of
criminal repression comes from the fact that the people who have to be discouraged
from committing the crime in the future are not those who are suffering the
punishment—or, at least, they are only secondarily. An unconsidered employment of
the strictest punishment, especially for less serious crimes, risks, then, discouraging
a smaller number of crimes than was previously thought.
The horrible show of a criminal led to the gallows by the hand of justice will not
cause, then, the same impression it should cause, when it is frequently offered before
34An almost identical definition is already present in Head XXX of the same book.
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the eyes of the nation. The law, frustrated in its hopes, will see its massacres watched
with indifference by the spectators, and it will read in their fearless faces the
ineffectiveness of a remedy whose price is the life of a man (Filangieri 1780–85,
Head XXX, Book III).
Legislators have to avoid inflicting too-strict penalties, and, most of all, to
applying them for crimes that show a disproportion between their dangerousness and
the awaited punishment. The way to be followed to avoid this is to abide by the
principle by which the penalty has to deprive the criminal of a right whose value
equals the loss caused by the crime. The grades of negligence and fraud are the only
allowed variables in this equivalence, and the only ones needed to construct
a complete and consistent penal scale. Any other policy aiming at manipulating
the entity of the sanctions and their discretionary employment ends inevitably in
a diversion between the value of opinion and the absolute value, and allows wide
margins of impunity.
But if the law should punish the slightest offence with this same penalty, the punishment
would no more be effective; it wouldn’t be able to apply this penalty against any higher
crime; it would need to look for a new penalty; it would see the absolute value of exile
weakened by the value of position it has been given. The citizen used to see exile
applied against the lightest crimes, will also get used to believe it less painful. . . . If
legislators had known the art of combining the absolute value with the one of position in
each penalty, they would have also obtained the desired proportion between crimes and
punishment, without taking one single step out of the inviolable boundaries of
moderation (Filangieri 1780–85, Head XL, Book III).
To the conclusion drawn by Beccaria and Bentham that excessive strictness is
expensive, ineffective, and unfair, Filangieri adds the analytical demonstration that
a legislation oriented to overdeterrence is, as a matter of fact, impracticable as well as
socially counterproductive.
Rather than acting arbitrarily on the degrees of strictness, legislators have, among
other possibilities, the choice of combining several penalties. Crime doesn’t
necessarily affect one single right, and it often consists in the violation of
a multiplicity of rights. The value of the crime, as the author defines it—or, better,
the social damage it causes, as we would say today—is the global result of the loss
caused to each single right by the guilty. It is then logical that different sanctions can
be applied together to produce a wider deterrence, and each of them has to be, in turn,
graded according to the entity of the action it aims at repressing.
The homicide committed with the maximum grade of fraud is always inferior to the
homicide committed with the same grade of fraud but joined with theft; and if also
concussion with the same grade of fraud is joined to homicide and theft, we will
have a third crime which is higher than the other two. Non infamous death should
then be sentenced for the first crime; the mark of infamy should be added to death
for the second one; and a pecuniary penalty should be added to death and infamy for
the third one. That’s how penalties have to be combined. Without this economy, it
will be necessary either to resort to a kind of ferocious and tyrannical death, or to
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ignore the proportion between punishment and crimes (Filangieri 1780–85, Head
XL, Book III).
Finally, to review the types of penalty that have been proposed, five categories can
be identified: capital, infamous, pecuniary, depriving or suspending personal
freedom, and depriving or suspending civil prerogatives. The first penalty, which
meets a marked common hostility in the literature of the time, is the object of
criticism for the consequences of an indiscriminate employment of strictness.
However, unlike what Beccaria and other reformers of the time asserted, it is not
the legitimacy of the authorities in giving death to citizens that is questioned. As in
the state of nature, any man can kill whoever unfairly makes attempts on his life; by
transitivity, civil society obtains the same faculty. To the abolitionist thesis, according
to which with the social contract no individual has ever given away the right to life,
the Neapolitan scholar replies that what the sovereign has transmitted is not the rights
of people over themselves but those of each over the others.
As far as the other punishments are concerned, which are widely dealt with,
individually, in La Scienza della Legislazione, it is the case of pointing out some
considerations of the pecuniary ones and those restrictive of freedom. The former
are usually the object of two types of criticism, one contesting the transformation of
the crime in a good that can be bought in the market; and the other attacking the
disproportioning effects that would follow. Filangieri has a ready reply for both types
of criticism. First of all, this type of sanction is not addressed to repressing any crime
but only those caused by the greed for money. Secondly, the fine must not be
a predetermined sum but a portion of the criminal’s property in order to equally
subject to law men with different incomes. There is also the advantage of keeping the
sanction safe from possible inflations that would risk varying its strictness in-
dependently from the will of the legislator.
The penalties that deprive individuals of freedom are those that should punish
the majority of crimes, since they can more easily be applied to crimes that differ in
quality and seriousness. They can be distinguished by detention, hard labor,
deportation, and exile. To each of them is dedicated a thorough analysis, but the
element they have in common and that makes them more effective than the other
sanctions is the ease by which they allow construction of a penal scale, since they are
characterized by time duration, a dimension in itself easy to subdivide and grade.
Unlike the way in which contemporary theorists proceed, Filangieri doesn’t consider
fines as the optimal sanction and detention as an alternative punishment residual to the
failure of the previous. The penalty to be employed more widely, for almost the whole
universality of crimes, is the deprivation of freedom, while the pecuniary one should be
restricted to a very limited number of crimes. Moreover, La Scienza della Legislazione
lacks an analysis of the values and limitations of monetary sanctions.
V. CONTROVERSIAL ELEMENTS IN THE FILANGIERIAN ANALYSIS
The analysis in La Scienza della Legislazione is original and strongly innovative, but
at the same time it is not free from certain weak points where it is inaccurate, not
fully comprehensive, or seems to fall into contradiction.
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It can not be overlooked that the elements of marginalism, while evident in
Filangieri, appear in fullness only in the third book on punishment, while they are less
present in the second one, which, however, was written three years before and deals
just with economic themes. Therefore, the marginalist analysis doesn’t entirely
characterize each part of the Filangierian reasoning, and its immediate employment
in both the public and legislative sphere rather than in the market leads one to believe
that its formulation could rise as an advanced and well-made evolution of the felicific
calculus, which is typical of eighteenth-century utilitarianism and, later, of Ben-
tham.35 Two considerations must be taken into account: in Book II, the author is
interested mainly in economic policy rather than in aspects we would define as
microeconomic, whose explanation he seems to consider as present in the literature of
the time; in the following book the need for a much more solid demonstration of the
theory on deterrence must have urged, in a more mature Filangieri, an effort of
analytical originality on the theme of value. In any case, as I indicated in the
introduction to this essay, a characteristic of the authors of the time was the
possibility that the most original contributions of economic analysis could be traced
in the writings dedicated to law, rather than in those dealing with phenomena more
strictly connected with the market. However, the passages of Book II where Filangieri
deals with the value of goods do not contrast with the marginalist elements that
followed, since they can still be referred to a psychological and utilitarian approach.
The terminology employed expresses content that modern theorists associate with
a wider, and more detailed, range of terms. Even though words like ‘‘value,’’ ‘‘price,’’
and ‘‘utility’’ have meanings that are consistent and acceptable today, the pioneering
nature of this work implies that they are to be used to refer to theoretical concepts
that are not perfectly assimilable and not clearly distinct, as well. The most evident
example is the expression ‘‘value of opinion,’’ which should be an application of the
idea of decreasing marginal utility of punishments, but, in effect, it can lead to the
idea of ‘‘marginal efficiency.’’ Filangieri seems, indeed, at ease in shifting with great
confidence from the theory of marginal utility to that of marginal productiveness,
leaving the reader with a feeling of vagueness. In fact, La Scienza della Legislazione
gives a clear and precise definition of the first, but its application appears rather to
culminate in an attempt to analyze the marginal effects of sanctions and of their
productiveness in terms of deterrence.
Another aspect of weakness is the one regarding the lay and economic visions of
law and of human behavior, which sometimes are found in the text together with
other expressions that seem to reveal a survival of moralist contents. An example is in
the passages dedicated to the description of the strategies of non-cooperation
pursued by a criminal when that description is qualified by the adjective ‘‘wicked.’’
Such expressions, which can be found also in other passages of this work, could be
seen as the employment of traditional terms that were usual in the language of the
time, though obsolete for a text that aims at carrying out a scientific analysis of
society and its institutions. Perplexities remain if we pay attention to the statement
that any violation of the social pact has to be considered criminal and punished, as
35Filangieri, however, goes well beyond the attempts to measure pleasure through the categories of
intensity or of duration, and links the concept of utility directly to that of price, questioning himself on
relative prices.
GAETANO FILANGIERI AND LA SCIENZA DELLA LEGISLAZIONE 243
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1053837211000046
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Library, on 02 Feb 2017 at 03:10:58, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
long as that violation is made deliberately and causes a damage. There seems to be
lacking an evaluation of the efficiency of crimes that would identify as such only
those actions whose net social cost is not exceeded by the individual benefits they
bring, in favor of an ethical consideration of the transgressions to the legal order.
This is a well-grounded doubt, yet (partly at least) dispelled in those passages where
our author explains that in order to investigate a crime with certainty, it is necessary
to also investigate which alternative options were available to whoever committed
it, and whether the choice that has been made is the one that imposes the lowest
possible loss to society, in favour of the personal advantage obtained by the criminal.
However, it must be considered that the presence of ethical and extra-economic
elements is consistent with eighteenth-century public language, when the matter of
the reformation of punishment fell within an exquisitely moral and political debate
over behavior, virtues, and values of modern individualist and commercial society.
Moving to strictly analytical problems, in this work the possibility of operating
equivalences between the right violated by a crime and the one to be lost by penalty is
too easily taken for granted, provided that the latter can’t be of the same nature as the
former. Filangieri doesn’t see the point because he thinks it is always possible to fix
relative prices for the rights and decree the corresponding punishment according to
them, but he doesn’t explain whether qualitatively different utilities can be
subdivided in quantities that are comparable.
The position of the author is also not fully firm and univocal in the employment of the
concept of ‘‘utility.’’ Filangieri, like the majority of the writers of the time, doesn’t show
any perplexity over the possibility of operating cardinal measurements of utility, even if, in
many significant passages, he seems to give them up in favor of a more simple criterion of
ordinality. It is not clear if he had perceived the logical and analytical problems raised by
the employment of cardinal utility and by interpersonal comparisons, but in the pages of
this work, the obstacle still sometimes seems to be avoided by the author’s working directly
on the concept of price. In La Scienza della Legislazione, the utility of the goods is often
drawn by investigating the prices given to them by society.
Two questions arise on the theme of severity, regarding the compatibility of the
thesis stated in the work. To begin with, the idea of correcting a scarce probability of
enforcement of the penalty with a proportional increase, in order to grant the same
level of deterrence, is hardly compatible with the demonstration that an increase in
rigor implies, at the margin, the fall of the utility of the penalty, and, consequently,
the value of position moves away from the absolute one.36 Perhaps the author had
imagined small variations within the scale of six grades of fraud and negligence, but
this case is not clear enough.
The most interesting question is of a dynamic nature, and involves the conviction
that, by increasing general wealth, civilization makes crime less appealing and, in
turn, punishment less necessary and generally less heavy. This theory witnesses the
Enlightenment trust in human progress, but in some instances could be incompatible
36By adopting the logic that Filangieri follows, the increase in the strictness of the penalty for a given
crime automatically implies that the penalty for a higher crime is applied more frequently, and then its
marginal value collapses together with its efficiency as a deterrent, with consequences that affect the
whole penal scale. As well, the author had also asserted that when a sanction is disproportionate
compared to the damage caused by crime, it becomes harder to enforce it.
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with the marginalist analysis holding the theory on penalty. The growth of the rights and
of their value should more effectively dissuade people from committing crimes against
the rights of the others, and, at the same time, to fear more their loss caused by penalty.
It is then possible to reconsider the entity of the sanctions and still obtain the same level
of deterrence. This scenario, which implies abandoning the equality between punish-
ment and damage, doesn’t take into consideration the fact that, in conformity with the
marginalist principle, a greater individual availability of rights causes a collapse in their
marginal utility, and this is in contrast with the supposed increase in their value. Even the
penalty, at this point, would indeed be lighter but it would also be a lesser deterrent
towards crime: a dilemma that doesn’t affect Filangieri and could be resolved by
supposing a growth of wealth in quality rather than in quantity. However, such
a conclusion is to be excluded, since Book II pays much attention to how nations
should produce more and more utility, and redistribute it equally within themselves.
A possible solution is that the value of rights should increase faster than their availability
for the citizens (an idea that is not easy to trace within the Filangierian pages), or,
alternatively, that human development would consent to those rights to grant greater
satisfaction compared to the past, regardless of quantity. This interpretation is probably
more in tune with the logic followed by the author and the culture of the moment, which
poses human development as an indispensable premise for growth, but this needs further
investigation and textual comparisons.
The conclusion could be drawn that La Scienza della Legislazione presents
remarkable analytical sprints forward, though accompanied by some theoretical
uncertainties. These don’t diminish the innovative extent of the work, though they
prevent full acceptance of its results. These difficulties are both understandable and
justifiable if traced back to the historical moment when Filangieri conceived the
proto-neoclassical framework on which he based his theory on crime, which—it
should be remembered—is of a century prior to the advent of Marginalism.
VI. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Book III of La Scienza della Legislazione offers other pages that are rich in original
starting points for the economic analysis of law when it deals with the question of
judiciary procedure and its guaranties. These passages are of relevant theoretical
value within the work because they subject traditional institutions, such as torture or
the exercise of feudal justice, to a tight criticism, and the judgments over these
institutions are among the most popular in the Filangierian thought. In fact,
interesting arguments can be traced regarding: a) the distorted spurs that violent
inquisitions exercise over the defendants’ choices; b) the incomes by position and
corruption (which are both congenital to the administration of justice in the feud); and
c) the difficulty for the legislator to reach an equilibrium in offering the citizens a fair
amount of security from crime that is compatible with an equally satisfying level of
guarantee from errors by the enquiring authorities.37 The analysis of the functioning
37According to Filangieri, public security and respect for civil rights are two goods that, in the absence of
perfect information, are impossible to enjoy in quantities independent from one another. Each increase of
the former, in fact, implies an equivalent reduction of the latter. See Head XV, Book III.
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of baronial justice is noteworthy above all, since it enters a wider reflection, which
occurs in all the books of the work, concerning the effects feudal institutions had on
the prosperity of nations, and the unfair distribution of wealth it generated.38
A comprehensive exposition of the author’s economic analysis of law shouldn’t
overlook consideration of such significant parts of his theory as those I have pointed
out. However, the present essay doesn’t aim at devising a comprehensive re-
construction of the reflection over crime and punishment, since its object is more
circumscribed, and aims, instead, at focusing on the economic elements that occur in
Filangieri’s study on public policy for deterrence.
Independent of the merits and limitations of the thought of the Neapolitan
writer, the historiographical datum that can be acquired is a confirmation that the
Enlightenment juridical literature shows some elements, particularly evident in the
criminal sphere, that forerun the study of modern law and economics. Those traits
characterizing the economic approach to the study of law, which are valid also for
contemporary theories such as, the hedonistic perspective, consequentialism (even
though the latter appears to be relatively moderate), welfarism, and the possibility
that rules of law can become spurs for the rational choices made by individuals, can,
in fact, all be traced in La Scienza della Legislazione. But what further confirms this
intellectual affinity between two distant moments in the history of economic ideas is
not only the attempt to apply economics to the understanding of law, but the recurrent
employment of analytical instruments that are close to neoclassical microeconomics.
Such an ascertainment didn’t slip out of Gary Becker in ‘‘Crime and Punishment,’’
where he claims the noble heritage from the works by Beccaria and Bentham.
Not only have I pointed out, in La Scienza della Legislazione, the typical
eighteenth-century tendency to develop an economic analysis of law, but this
tendency, though less known compared to the more eminent attempts of the above-
mentioned authors, seemed in some instances even more advanced both in the
epistemological perspective and in the results it obtained. The idea that rights should
be seen as goods that are present in the market, and are the object of estimation and
transfer between men, is at least as innovative as the conviction that individuals order
them hierarchically according to their value. The description of social relationship as
reciprocal obligations between citizens and society, directed towards the exchange of
benefits, is just as original. Finally, the policy against crime offers an example of how
to conceive a system of rules of law able to accomplish the aim of defending both
individual wealth and rights, with the lowest possible loss of both public and
individual utility. Filangieri’s historical merit is to have grounded these theoretical
contributions on an analytical base whose formulation is exposed with clearness and
precision in Book III, and which is consciously employed in demonstrating the actual
functioning of criminal deterrence and of the employment of sanctions. This is an
example of clear forerunning of a method and of an analytical perspective close to
those of neoclassical economics and of even greater modernity in the choice of the
object of study to which to apply them.
At the end of the present work, I think the reader is faced with some questions, and
equally fruitful fields of research open for him. Maybe the economist will find it
38Filangieri deals with feudal justice in Book III, Part I.
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interesting to examine the Filangierian work and more generally the forerunners of
modern law and economics to find analogies or differences that suggest new
hypotheses of investigation. The historian of economic thought will probably
understand the importance of analyzing more deeply those tendencies and authors
that, in the Enlightenment economics culture, have devoted themselves to the optimal
organization of a wealthy and rightful society, and the ability legal structures have
to contribute to producing, distributing, and preserving wealth. The reading of
La Scienza della Legislazione teaches that, in following this direction, it is not enough
to stop when facing writings that are markedly about economics, but it is essential to
question most of all the pages about law and constitution in order to trace original
economic ideas that remain overlooked in historiography. Filangieri, who, in recent
years, has been the object of a general revision by historiographers necessarily
affecting economic thought, deserves a particularly deep study, especially in the light
of the traits of modernity I have pointed out in his work.
Finally, historians remain with the task of understanding why the eighteenth-
century experience of economic study on the juridical and institutional field, in spite
of the authors of great prestige who have studied it, hasn’t given life to a solid
tradition, but has slowly declined until disappearing with the rise of that marginalism
that the above-mentioned experience had widely forerun. The connection between
contemporary law and economics and its Enlightenment precedent seems, in fact, to
depend more on inspiration by such authors as Becker than to be the result of a legacy
of knowledge and doctrines that has been handed down from the eighteenth century
to today.
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